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Abstract In this paper we estimate health plan price
elasticities and financial switching gains for consumers
over a 20-year period in which managed competition was
introduced in the Dutch health insurance market. The
period is characterized by a major health insurance reform
in 2006 to provide health insurers with more incentives and
tools to compete, and to provide consumers with a more
differentiated choice of products. Prior to the reform, in the
period 1995–2005, we find a low number of switchers,
between 2 and 4% a year, modest average total switching
gains of 2 million euros per year and short-term health plan
price elasticities ranging from -0.1 to -0.4. The major
reform in 2006 resulted in an all-time high switching rate
of 18%, total switching gains of 130 million euros, and a
high short-term price elasticity of -5.7. During 2007–2015
switching rates returned to lower levels, between 4 and 8%
per year, with total switching gains in the order of 40
million euros per year on average. Total switching gains
could have been 10 times higher if all consumers had
switched to one of the cheapest plans. We find short-term
price elasticities ranging between -0.9 and -2.2. Our
estimations suggest substantial consumer inertia
throughout the entire period, as we find degrees of choice
persistence ranging from about 0.8 to 0.9.
Keywords Managed competition  Health insurance 
Health plan price elasticity  Switching gains
JEL Classification I18  C33
Introduction
In health care systems with a competitive health insurance
market sufficiently price-elastic, demand is important for
motivating health insurers to act as cost-conscious pur-
chasing agents on behalf of their customers. A recent sys-
tematic review of empirical studies on price elasticity of
health plan choice identified clear-cut price elasticity ranges
for different country settings but substantial variation in
price elasticities across various countries [1]. For the
Netherlands, where competition among health insurers was
introduced within the social health insurance (SHI)
scheme in 1996, the review study found short-term price
elasticities smaller than -0.5, which were well below most
of those found in other countries.1 As noticed by Pendzialek
et al. [1], however, evidence about the Netherlands is dated,
since the empirical studies only relate to the situation before
a major health insurance reform in 2006, and almost no
information could be found on price elasticities in the years
following the reform. This limitation is particularly trou-
blesome because the primary goal of the reform was to
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1 Short-term health plan price elasticities in the SHI market have
been estimated before in several empirical studies, covering the years
before 2000 [2, 3], the period until 2002 [4] and the same SHI period
as in this paper [5].
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enhance consumer choice and competition in order to rein-
force insurers’ incentives to improve the efficiency of care.
The main contribution of this paper is to fill this gap in the
empirical literature by estimating the price elasticity of health
plan choice in the Netherlands after the major reform in 2006.
Using data on prices andmarket shares of all health plans over
the period 2005–2015, we examine whether price elasticities
of health plan choice increased relative to the low price elas-
ticities prior to the reform. For a good comparison between the
twoperiods,we re-estimated the price elasticities for the entire
pre-reform period 1995–2005. This is because previous
empirical studies use different methodologies and typically
cover only part of the pre-reform period. As noticed by
Pendzialek et al. [1], health plan price elasticities are difficult
to compare because of the differences in methodologies and
data sources of the included studies. Therefore, a second
important contribution is that we provide consistent estimates
of health plan price elasticities using the same methodology
and data over a 20-year period.We are not aware of any other
study that consistently estimated annual health plan choice
over such a long period.2 Third, we contribute to the literature
by also calculating the annual net financial switching gains for
consumers over a 20-year period, uncovering also the sources
of these gains. This provides a unique indication about the
extent to which consumers financially benefited from
switching and how these benefits changed over time. There-
fore, our findings may offer important insights for health
policy on how to influence consumer choice and price com-
petition in health insurance markets.
Our paper is organized as follows. In ‘‘Overview of the
Dutch health insurance market 1995–2015’’ we describe
the main differences between the pre-reform and the post-
reform health insurance market in the Netherlands. Sec-
tion ‘‘Financial switching gains for premium payers’’ dis-
cusses the financial switching gains for premium payers.
Section ‘‘Model and estimation methods’’ explains the
estimation methods and empirical strategy. In ‘‘Data’’ we
describe the data and in ‘‘Estimation results’’ the estimation
results. Section ‘‘Conclusion’’ concludes.
Overview of the Dutch health insurance market
1995–2015
SHI market 1995–2005
In the past 20 years the Dutch health insurance system
gradually moved towards a system of managed
competition. Until 2005, health insurance for basic health
care services consisted of a mandatory social health
insurance (SHI) scheme for people in lower income
brackets (about two thirds of the population) and a vol-
untary private health insurance system for people with a
higher income.3 The SHI scheme was administered by
sickness funds (not-for-profit health insurers). Health care
expenses were largely covered by income-related contri-
butions that were collected in a central fund and then
redistributed to sickness funds. The share of income-related
contributions as a percentage of total expenses was about
90% until 2002, and was reduced to about 80% in 2003. As
a result, in 2003 the annual community-rated premium
increased from about 10 to 20% of total expenses (see row
‘‘Out of pocket premiums/total cost (%)’’ in Table 1).4 To
cover the residual costs, sickness funds were allowed to
charge an annual community-rated premium (Table 2).
Since 1993 sickness funds were increasingly put at risk for
the medical expenses of their enrollees, by gradually
replacing retrospective reimbursement by risk-adjusted
capitation payments. In addition, the former legally pro-
tected regional monopolies were abolished and sickness
funds were allowed to compete for customers all over the
country. Eligible people were allowed to change sickness
funds, and sickness funds were obliged to accept all
applicants.5
As shown in Table 1, in 1996 the financial risk for the
sickness funds was substantially raised (from 3 to 13%),
resulting for the first time in meaningful differences in
annual premiums.6 For this reason we chose 1995 as the
starting year for estimating health plan price elasticities and
switching gains. Incentives for price competition among
sickness funds were gradually reinforced by stepwise
2 In the systematic review by Pendzialek et al. [1] most of the 41
included empirical studies cover only a few years. Only three studies
cover more than 10 years but include various institutional settings
over the years.
3 The SHI scheme can be regarded as the precursor of the HIA
scheme introduced in 2006 because both schemes have many features
in common (i.e. both are mandatory insurance schemes with a
comprehensive standardized benefits package, partly income-related
and partly community-rated premiums, and carried out by competing
health insurers). Therefore, we compare the SHI with HIA here and
do not consider the voluntary private health insurance scheme. Private
indemnity health insurance covered about a third of the Dutch
population with earnings above a legally determined income thresh-
old. Benefit packages were similar to that of SHI, although there was
substantial variation in both the scope of benefits and cost-sharing
arrangements. Enrollment was voluntary, premiums were risk-rated
and medical underwriting was allowed. For an extensive description
of the private insurance market, see Tapay and Colombo [6], and for
the SHI market, see Douven and Schut [7].
4 Income-related contributions were annually set by the government
as a percentage of gross income up to an annually adjusted threshold
(about 32,600 euros in 2005).
5 From 1993 to 1995 people were allowed to switch once every 2
years. To facilitate consumer choice, since 1996 fixed annual open
enrollment periods were introduced.
6 From 1993 to 1995, except for one small sickness fund, all sickness
funds charged the same annual premium.
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increasing of sickness funds’ risk on medical expenses.
This resulted in an increasing premium variation across
sickness funds (Table 2).7
Next to premiums, sickness funds had only limited room
to distinguish themselves. The room for negotiating dif-
ferent contracts with providers was almost nonexistent,
since provider prices were highly regulated and selective
contracting was only permitted for outpatient care. More-
over, sickness funds were not allowed to offer different
health plans or to vertically integrate with providers. Five
small sickness funds entered the market in the early years,
but after 1998 only mergers took place and the number of
sickness funds decreased from 26 to 21 in 2005 (Table 1
and Appendix B).
Sickness funds also provided supplementary health
insurance, comprising about 5% of total revenues. Sup-
plementary coverage typically includes dental care for
adults, physiotherapy and medical appliances, such as
spectacles and hearing aids. Supplementary and basic
health insurance are often sold together so consumers
might base their decisions to switch also on the combined
premium [2].8
From 2001 to 2005 about 2–4% of the enrollees annu-
ally switched to another sickness fund [8]. Although the
number of switchers from earlier years is lacking, the
percentage of switchers from 1996 to 2000 is likely to be
lower since the premium differences across sickness funds
were small (Table 2) and many consumers might not even
have been aware of the possibility of switching.9
Health Insurance Act 2006–2015
In 2006 the scope of the managed competition model was
broadened to the entire population by the introduction of a
new Health Insurance Act (HIA). Former sickness funds
and former private indemnity insurers were allowed to
compete for providing basic health insurance to all Dutch
citizens. The basic idea behind this reform was to increase
efficiency by promoting more competition among health
insurers and among health care providers. To preserve
universal access and maintain equity the government fol-
lowed a setup along the lines of the SHI, including
mandatory insurance for a standardized basic benefit
package, a partly community-rated and partly income-re-
lated premium, open enrollment and a risk adjustment
system.
The government substantially increased health insurers’
financial risk by further abolishing ex-post cost reim-
bursement to health insurers. As shown in Table 1, for all
health insurers the financial risk on medical expenses was
gradually raised from 53% in 2005 to 99% in 2015.
In addition in 2006, the share of income-related premi-
ums in total health care expenditure was reduced from 80%
(SHI) to 50% (HIA), and this latter share is fixed by law
(see row ‘‘Annual premiums/total cost (%)’’ in Table 1).
This implied a significant increase of the annual premium
for people previously enrolled in SHI from about 380 euros
in 2005 to about 1050 euros in 2006 (see Table 2). The
idea of policymakers behind this change was that a higher
annual premium would make people more aware and cost-
conscious of the high health care costs. To maintain equity,
households with earnings below a certain threshold were
compensated by monthly income-dependent subsidies.
Both sickness funds and private insurers were allowed to
offer health insurance under the HIA. In 2006 basic health
insurance was offered by 33 health insurers, but due to
mergers and consolidation this number decreased to 25 in
2015, while no new insurers entered the market during this
period (Table 1 and Appendix B).
In contrast to the former SHI scheme, the HIA offered
health insurers several options to differentiate basic health
insurance contracts to increase consumer choice. First,
insurers were allowed to offer a voluntary deductible up to
500 euros per year in return for a premium discount. Next,
health insurers were also allowed to offer group contracts
at a premium discount of at maximum 10% of a similar
individual contract. Third, health insurers were allowed to
provide coverage in terms of service benefits, indemnity
payments and a combination of both. Fourth, the HIA
created more opportunities for health insurers to offer
preferred or limited provider plans and to manage care by
increasing the room for selective contracting and by
allowing vertical integration with providers [9].
The introduction of the HIA had a large impact on the
health insurance market. In the first year of the reform
health insurers engaged in a premium war.10 Although
7 An increase in price competition may also result in lower premium
variation. However, since premium competition was absent before
1996 we interpret the increase in premium variation as a sign of
increasing price competition.
8 Supplementary benefit packages were quite similar across health
insurers. Schut and Hassink [2] found a somewhat higher price
elasticity for combined health insurance (-0.4) than basic health
insurance (-0.3).
9 In 2001, 83% of the sickness fund enrollees responded in a survey
that they had not even considered switching. This share declined to
77% in 2005 [8].
10 Health insurers have to announce new health plan premiums each
year before November 20 and enrollees that are willing to switch have
to notify their insurer before the end of the year that they want to
terminate the contract. Every year since 2006 the same small regional
insurer is the first to announce its premium early in October, attracting
a lot of free publicity. Until 2015 most health insurers announced new
health plan premiums 10–20 days before the deadline, but in 2015
about half of the insurers waited until the last week and the variation
in announcement dates decreased [10]. The health insurer with the
lowest health plan premium typically waits until all other health plan
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people were not forced to switch health insurers since basic
health plans were offered by both former sickness funds
and private health insurers, for all people the choice setting
and choice options radically changed. The massive media
coverage around the reform, combined with a large
increase in choice for different benefit packages and large
premium differences, made many people aware of potential
switching benefits. Hence, many people were triggered to
reconsider their previous choice of health insurer. The
threat of many customers making a cost-conscious choice
forced insurers to offer contracts at annual premiums below
the break-even price, resulting in substantial losses by
insurers in 2006 [11]. This effectuated an all-time-high
switching rate of 17.8% in 2006 (Table 2).11 Such a high
switching rate was far above what had been experienced
before in the Dutch health insurance markets (including the
former private health insurance market). As shown in
Table 2, during the first 4 years after 2006, switching rates
between health insurers dropped from 18 to about 4%, but
then increased to about 6–8% during the next 5 years.
Most health insurers offer both individual and group
contracts. Group contracts can be concluded with any legal
entity, and in total more than 50,000 group contracts are
concluded annually with a huge variety of groups [10].12
Table 2 shows that group contracts are on average 50–70
euros per year lower priced than individual policies (im-
plying a premium discount of about 5%). Most Dutch
people have several options to join a group contract and the
share of the population opting for a group contract
increased from 53% in 2006 to 69% in 2015 (Table 1).
In addition to mandatory basic insurance, most people
(about 85%) also bought voluntary supplementary insur-
ance, just as in the former SHI market [10]. Although
people can buy basic and supplementary coverage from
different insurers, almost none did (only 0.19% of those
buying supplementary insurance) [10]. As in the SHI
market, the most important supplementary benefits are still
dental care for adults and physiotherapy, but the variation
in coverage substantially increased. Premiums for supple-
mentary insurance plans are on average about 20–25% of
those of basic health insurance plans [13]. Medical
underwriting is allowed, but in practice only required for
5% of all supplementary policies (typically the most
extensive ones) and for 24% of dental insurance policies
[10]. Since almost all consumers buy supplementary and
basic health insurance together, high-risk individuals may
be restricted in choosing basic health plans by the under-
writing practices of health insurers with respect to sup-
plementary insurance. Indeed, several studies found that a
substantial number of elderly and high-risk individuals do
not switch to another insurer because they believe that they
will not be accepted for supplementary insurance by
another insurer [14, 15]. Boonen et al. [16] found that
having supplementary insurance significantly reduces older
people’s switching propensity.
Health insurers also compete with the premium dis-
counts for people opting for a voluntary deductible on top
of the mandatory deductible.13 The percentage of con-
sumers choosing a voluntary deductible has increased from
about 3% in 2006 to 12% in 2015 [13].
Since 2010 an increasing number of health insurers
introduced lower-priced contracts with restricted provider
networks and substantial co-payments for accessing outside
network providers (Table 1). In 2015 about 7.5% of the
population (1.25 million people) was enrolled in such a
limited provider plan [10].
Financial switching gains for premium payers
Figure 1 exhibits switching gains and premium variation
for the total 20-year period (1996-2015) making clear that
switching gains for premium payers substantially increased
due to the reform, with a peak in the reform year itself. We
also observe an increasing trend in premium variation,
corresponding with an increasing variety in health plan
products after the reform year and the growing insurers’
risk on medical expenses. In the next subsections we dis-
cuss these switching gains.
Switching gains in the SHI market (1996–2005)
To examine whether consumers respond to premium dif-
ferences across health plans we calculated total annual
switching gains. To that end we compare the total average
annual premiums (weighted by insurers’ market shares)
before and after switching (see Appendix A for a more
detailed explanation). In Table 2 we show that total
Footnote 10 continued
premiums are known, in order to be sure of being the cheapest health
plan.
11 In addition to the 18% of the population switching between health
insurers, 5-10% changed health plans within their insurer, so
including these intra-insurer switchers raises the total number of
switchers in 2006 to 23–28% [12].
12 In 2015, 56% of group contracts were employer-based, while other
group contracts were concluded with a large variety of entities, such
as labor unions, sport federations, cooperative banks, and interest
associations for elderly and patients (e.g. for diabetes and rheumatoid
arthritis) [10]. Group contracts with elderly and patient organizations
are feasible because health insurers are compensated for predictably
high expenditures by the risk adjustment system.
13 Initially, in 2006 and 2007, there was a mandatory no-claim rebate
of 255 euros per year. In 2008, this no-claim rebate was replaced by a
mandatory deductible of 150 euros per year, which was gradually
raised to 375 euros per year in 2015.
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switching gains increased from zero in 1995 to 6.7 million
euros in 2005. Thus, average total switching gains over the
period are about 2 million euros per year. These switching
gains are very modest. For example, in the year of the
highest switching rate, 2005, average gains were 0.8 euros
per premium payer and about 16 euros per switcher (i.e.
4% of the average annual premium). They are also very
modest compared to potential total switching gains in the
SHI market, which in any year could have been 100–200
times higher if all consumers had switched that year to one
of the cheapest health insurers (see Table 2).14
There are several potential explanations for the observed
increase in switching gains. First, only since 1996 have
consumers been able to switch sickness funds once every
year, and all sickness funds slowly started to compete on
price and to attract customers from other sickness funds.
Hence, it is likely that consumer awareness of switching
opportunities has increased over time. Second, switching
gains are likely to be larger when premium variation
increases. Third, switching gains may also depend on
institutional changes that affect insurers’ price setting
behaviour. For instance, in 2003, several sickness funds
had to raise their annual premiums because the government
reduced the income-related contribution from 90 to 78% of
total expenses. This change may have induced several
sickness funds to adopt another pricing strategy. For
example, large sickness funds were becoming relatively
more expensive, which is reflected in Table 1 by the fact
that for the first time weighted premiums before switching
substantially exceeded the average premium. Notice,
however, that in 2003 the weighted premiums after
switching were also substantially higher than the average
annual premiums, suggesting substantial consumer inertia,
since many enrollees apparently decided to stick with the
relatively expensive large sickness funds.
Switching gains in the HIA market (2006–2015)
Calculating switching gains in the HIA market is more
complicated than in the SHI market because consumers do
not only switch between health plans but also between
individual and group contracts of these health plans (for a
detailed explanation, see Appendix A). The last two rows
in Table 2 report the financial switching gains in this per-
iod. Switching gains were particularly high in the reform
year 2006 with total switching gains of 130 million euros.
The average gain per switcher remained fairly
stable around 45 euros during 2006–2015 (see Table 2)
but, compared to 2006, the number of switchers were
substantially lower after the reform year.15 Still, with an
average of 40 million per year during 2007–2015 total
switching gains are quite modest, although much higher
than prior to the reform. If in any year since 2007 all
consumers had switched to one of the cheapest health
insurers, total switching rates that year could have been
about 10 times higher (see Table 2).
Nevertheless, consumers substantially benefited from
switching since the introduction of the HIA. Table 3 shows
a decomposition of the total switching gains into gains
from switching within and between individual and group
contracts. Initially, most switching gains came from
switching from individual to group contracts, but as of
2011 this changed and most gains came from switching
within individual contracts. In 2015, we observe for the
first time a reverse trend and that more consumers switch
from a group contract to an individual contract. This is
likely to be the result of the introduction of cheaper indi-
vidual contracts for health plans with limited provider
networks in recent years that are targeted at young people,
who are much more inclined to switch [17].
Model and estimation methods
We estimate health plan price elasticities for three different
periods: (1) prior to the reform 1995–2005, (2) the reform
year 2006 and (3) the post-reform period 2007–2015.
For periods (1) and (3) we estimate an advanced
dynamic model that follows from a standard discrete
choice model, in which a consumer chooses an option out
of all possible insurance policies in the market that maxi-
mizes his/her utility [18, 19]. The market share sit of each
insurance policy i in year t is represented by the multino-
mial logit equation:
sit ¼ expðbpit þ ci þ eitÞP
j expðbpjt þ cj þ ejtÞ
; ð1Þ
where pit denotes the community-rated annual premiums.
The health plan fixed effect ci captures unobservable
attributes that may differ across health plans, such as dif-
ferences in the basic benefit package, health insurer quality,
amount of advertising and the provision of supplementary
insurance. Since data on these health plan attributes are not
available we have to make the rather restrictive assumption
that the impact of these attributes on market share do not
14 Notice that (potential) switching gains and premium setting are
interrelated. It is likely that an increase in the number of switchers
would result in more premium competition, which would reduce
premium variation and potential switching gains.
15 The low switching gains per premium payer in 2009 (see Table 2)
are for a large part explained by one insurer who raised its premium
on a large group contract to above the average premium in the market,
while only a few consumers in this group contract switched to a lower
priced contract [13]. In general, participating in a group contract is
associated with a lower switching propensity [16].
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change over time. We discuss the potential impact of this
assumption on the estimation results in the Discussion
Section. In addition, we assume that the stochastic term eit
in the individual utility function is independent and has
identically distributed extreme values [19, 20]. Taking
logarithms and transforming this equation, we obtain:
log sitð Þ ¼ bpit þ ci þ dt þ eit; ð2Þ
in which the term dt represents the denominator in Eq. (1).
This model assumes that all consumers deliberately
instantaneously choose a utility maximizing health insur-
ance policy. Many researchers have already shown that this
assumption does not hold for health insurance markets,
which are characterized by a strong degree of persistence in
health plan choice due to status quo bias, switching costs
and information frictions [21–23]. To account for persis-
tence in insurers’ market shares we follow Tamm et al. [18]
and modify the equation by including a lagged market
share term:
log sitð Þ ¼ a log si;t1
 þ bpit þ ci þ dt þ eit; ð3Þ
where 0 B a B 1 captures the average degree of persis-
tence in the market. If a = 0 the model is static and in that
case the model in Eq. (3) is similar to the instantaneous
choice model in Eq. (2). If 0\ a\ 1 there is some degree
of persistence in the market that becomes larger when a is
closer to one. From the specifications (1) and (3) we can
derive the individual short-term and long-term premium
elasticities, which we denote it and sit, and subsequently
annual average price elasticities t and st that we will report
in this study.16
it ¼ ositopit
pit
sit
¼ bpit 1 sitð Þ; t
 bptðin case sit is sufficiently smallÞ ð4Þ
sit ¼ 1
1 a it; st 
1
1 a t ð5Þ
A property of the discrete choice model is that the
elasticity in (4) is linearly related to the premium level pit,
implying that health plans face a convex demand curve
with regard to the level of the annual premium prevailing
in the market. All else equal, if there is a linear relationship
between price and elasticity, with the same coefficient b,
the price elasticity is about 3 times higher in a market with
a premium level of about 1000 euros (after the reform) than
about 350 euros (prior to the reform, since 2003).
In ‘‘Estimation results’’ we will estimate specification
(3) with an OLS-estimation and subsequently with
Fig. 1 Average annual switching gains per premium payer and
annual premium variation, 1996–2015. Switching gains per premium
payer (see Table 2) are displayed on the left axis and premium
variation (i.e. the standard deviation of annual premiums of group and
individual contracts, see Table 2) on the right axis
16 For a more extensive discussion of the derivation and properties of
the elasticities, see Tamm et al. [18] and Train [19]. Average annual
elasticities are calculated by a weighted average of the insurer specific
elasticities. In our study we have many health insurance policies (or
health plans) allowing us to make the simplifying assumption
et  bpt .
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generalized methods of moment (GMM) estimation. It is
well known that estimating the dynamic specification (3)
with standard fixed or random effect models is complicated
since the lagged term log (si,t-1) is likely to be correlated
with the error term, the sum of ci and eit. Under the
assumption of serially uncorrelated errors of eit we can use
a GMM estimator to obtain consistent estimates [24].
Premiums in (3) may also be endogenous. For example,
setting a lower premium to attract new consumers may be
less profitable for a large insurer because its loss on the
incumbent enrollees is predictably higher than for a smaller
insurer. GMM controls for this possible endogeneity of pit
by using lagged market shares and lagged premiums as
instruments.
In the SHI market each insurer offers a single health
plan with a similar benefit package. This is indicated in
(1) by subscript i. However, in the HIA market, each
insurer offers several health plans and often both indi-
vidual and group contracts. We do have access to all
individual contract prices in the market, but for group
contracts we have only information about the total
number of enrollees of all group contracts per health
plan and the corresponding (weighted) average premium
of these group contracts.17 In the HIA market the sub-
script i in (1) therefore refers to all individual contracts
and a group contract with a weighted premium per
health plan.
Finally, due to the integration of the former SHI and
private insurance schemes into the HIA, we performed a
separate estimation of health plan price elasticities during
the year of the reform (period 2). The separate dataset for
this transition covers 2 years, before (2005) and after
(2006) the introduction of the HIA.
Data
We obtained our data of health plan premiums and market
shares from three different sources corresponding with the
three periods, SHI, 1995–2005, the reform year 2006, and
the HIA, 2007–2015. The first dataset was obtained from
the Dutch National Health Care Institute (ZIN) and con-
stitutes an unbalanced panel of 37 health plans (sickness
funds) for 1995–2005 in the SHI (241 observations). In
Appendix B, Table 7, we describe all sickness funds in the
market.18
The second dataset was constructed by the Dutch
Healthcare Authority (NZa) including 30 health insurers
that were active in the years just before (2005) and just
after the reform (2006) (see Appendix B, Table 8). For
2005 market shares in the voluntary private health insur-
ance market were combined with market shares in the SHI
market in order to construct a dataset that was comparable
with HIA data on market shares (of both individual con-
tracts and group contracts) and premiums in 2006 (in total
54 observations).
The third source is an unbalanced panel dataset of
26–32 health insurers for 2007–2015 in the HIA (in total
694 observations) that was also obtained from the NZa.
Since health insurers were allowed to offer various health
plans, we collected information on all ‘‘legally different’’
health plans, that is plans differing in terms of reim-
bursement method (in cash, in kind, or a combination of
both) and contracted provider network. Next, we collected
for each health insurer market shares for all individual
contracts and an aggregated market share for all group
contracts. Furthermore, we collected the corresponding
annual premiums, and an average premium for all group
contracts per insurer. For a description of the data, see
Table 9 of Appendix B. Since many group contracts are
not accessible for the entire population, aggregating all
group contracts and using an average group premium per
insurer is a simplification that may downward bias our
estimates.19 However, aggregating all group contracts has
the advantage that it suits our discrete choice model bet-
ter, since a very large part of the population has the option
to choose at least one group contract at the average pre-
mium, which would certainly not be the case if we con-
sidered each group contract separately in our estimations.
This is because group contracts only differ in the price
discounts offered by the insurer, and per insurer a group
contract with an average discount rate is available to most
individuals.20
17 This information is collected through insurer surveys by the Dutch
healthcare authority.
18 The panel is unbalanced because of mergers. After a merger the
merging insurers were removed from the dataset and a new merged
insurer was added to our dataset in the year before the merger.
19 Price elasticities are estimated under the assumption that con-
sumers have free choice. Since not all group contracts are equally
accessible this will downward bias our estimate for the price
elasticity.
20 A distinction can be made between employer-based group
contracts and other group contracts. Employer-based group contracts
are typically only accessible for employees and dependents of the
specific employers. Most other group contracts are open group
contracts, meaning that they are accessible for all people joining the
legal entity concluding the contract. In 2015 the average premium
discount of employer-based group contracts relative to the same
individual contract was 8.5%, whereas the average discount on the
other group contracts was 6.4% [10].
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Estimation results
Estimated health plan price elasticities for the SHI
market (1996–2005)
As we explained in the Introduction, health plan price
elasticities in the Dutch SHI market have been estimated
before in several empirical papers. These studies found that
estimated annual price elasticities were small and often
below -0.5. However, these studies typically cover only
part of the pre-reform period, use different estimation
methods and did not include a lagged market share to
control for persistence in health plan choice. Therefore, the
price elasticities reported by these studies can be seen as
short-term elasticities. By contrast, our study covers the
entire period, and we estimate a dynamic model taking into
account choice persistence which allows us to estimate
long-term price elasticities as well. Especially in a longi-
tudinal study over many years, it is important to control for
changing market shares because these dynamic effects are
not captured by fixed insurer effects.
Table 4 summarizes both OLS and GMM estimates of
health plan price elasticities for the entire SHI period. We
included the OLS estimates for a better comparison with
the results for the reform year in which we could not use
GMM because of the small dataset. In this particular case,
the results of both methods appear to be close to each other.
The OLS estimates correspond to short-term price
elasticities ranging between -0.1 and -0.4 depending on
the premium level. This range is consistent with the results
of previous studies. For the GMM estimations we included
time dummies, individual effects and reported robust
standard errors. We report the GMM system estimator with
endogenous premiums [26], which we prefer for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, according to the econometric litera-
ture, the system GMM estimator has a better performance
in terms of bias and efficiency than the first-difference
GMM estimator. Second, premiums are likely to be
endogenous both because market shares may be associated
with market power and because large health plans may be
less willing to reduce premiums (e.g. because of solvency
regulations). Based on Sargan statistics [27, 28], we cannot
reject the hypothesis that the over identifying restrictions of
the system GMM estimator are valid.
The short-term price elasticity resulting from the GMM
estimator in estimation (ii) ranges from -0.1 (at a base
premium of 100 euros) to -0.4 (at a base premium level of
400 euros). This estimate implies that a health insurer
increasing its annual premium by 1% (about 1–4 euros)
would cause an insurer’s market share to decline by about
0.1–0.4%, depending on the premium level. The size of
these price elasticities is similar to the OLS estimates and
those found in previous studies.
We found a high degree of persistence in the SHI market
of around 90%, implying that most enrollees were sticking
with a once chosen sickness fund. Strong persistence
implies that long-term price elasticities are much higher
than short-term price elasticities. According to our discrete
choice model, Eq. 5, this strong persistence implies that
long-term price elasticities range from -0.8 to -4.8. This
means that if an insurer increases its premium by 1% each
year, for an infinite number of years, then its market share
would decline by 0.8–4.8%. The long-term elasticities are
extremely sensitive to the precise estimation of the degree
of persistence.
Estimated health plan price elasticities
for the reform year 2006
For estimating health plan price elasticities in the reform
year a specific dataset was constructed, comprising only 2
years (2005 and 2006). Given the small dataset we can only
use OLS to estimate Eq. (3) without fixed effects and time
dummies. Table 5 summarizes the estimations results.
The results indicate a high degree of choice persistence
of 84% in the market.
This result is in line with our earlier observation that a
large part of the population did not switch from health
insurer. We found a high health plan price elasticity of
about -5.7, which corresponds to the all-time high number
of switchers of 18% in 2006. The estimated price elasticity
implies that an average health insurer increasing its annual
premium by 1% (about 10 euros) would, in 2006, experi-
ence a decline in market share of about 5.7%. Nevertheless,
even in the reform year most people did not switch health
plans, despite health plan annual premiums for all people
changing dramatically relative to the preceding year. As a
matter of fact, we still found a high degree of persistence of
Table 3 Decomposition of
switching gains in HIA market,
2006–2015 (in millions of
euros)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total switching gainsa 26.6 2.6 51.1 45.1 44.6 49.2 53.0 53.8
Within individual contracts 0.6 3.1 14.7 25.5 25.1 24.0 23.1 37.6
Within group contracts -1.3 3.2 2.2 0.9 9.2 11.6 22.2 24.2
Shift from individual to group contract 27.3 2.7 34.2 18.7 10.3 13.6 7.7 -8.0
a Authors’ own calculations, see Appendix A
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84%, implying a corresponding extremely high long-term
price elasticity of -35.6 for the reform year 2006.
A limitation of the estimated price elasticity is that
because of the short period we could not include fixed
effects to account for insurer specific characteristics (e.g.
differences in supplementary insurance, service quality and
rebates for voluntary deductibles). However, surveys
among consumers indicate that, especially in 2006, price
was the most important determinant of health insurer
choice [12].
Estimated health plan price elasticities for the HIA
market (2007–2015)
Table 6 summarizes the estimation results for the health
plan price elasticity during the post-reform period. As for
the SHI market we present the results of both the OLS
estimation (including only time dummies) and GMM
estimation (including time dummies and individual
effects), and we report the GMM system estimator with
endogenous premiums [26].
As shown inTable 6, estimated short-termprice elasticities
range between -0.9 and -2.2 depending on the estimation
method. This is higher than in the pre-reform SHImarket, but
substantially lower than in the reform year. Compared to the
previous period, we find a larger discrepancy between the
OLS and GMM estimates. This can arise due to both a wider
variety and greater fluctuation in the number of health plans
offered in the market in this period (as shown in Table 2),
which increase premium endogeneity affecting OLS esti-
mates.Yet, we report theOLS results as an upper bound, since
robustness checks using alternative GMM specifications
resulted inprice elasticities higher than0.8 in absolute value.21
The results in Table 6 show that consumer inertia in the
HIA market is almost as high as in the SHI market, with a
degree of persistence of 80–90%. The degree of choice per-
sistence does not substantially differ between the three esti-
mation periods, but is significantly different from one. Long-
term price elasticities range from -5 to -40 and are again
very sensitive to the estimation of the degree of persistence.
It is possible that our long-term price elasticities are
overstated because the calculations assume that the short-
term price elasticity remains constant over the years. How-
ever, it is likely that some consumers are more persistent in
their choice of health plan than others, and that in practice
we only observe a limited group of potential switchers that
are price sensitive. Comparing our findings with Tamm et al.
[18] for the German social health insurance market, the only
other study that measured the degree of persistence in the
same way, we find lower long-term price elasticities. Tamm
et al. [18] cannot reject a degree of persistence of 100%
(a = 1) implying that long-term price elasticties are infinite,
indicating that market shares of German health insurers
could follow a random walk.
Table 4 Estimation results for
the health plan price elasticity in
the SHI market 1996–2005
log (sit) = a log (si,t-1) ? bpit ? ci ? dt ? eit, pt between 100 and 400 euros (see also Table 1)
(i) OLS estimation, number of observations: 243
a^ = 0.86*** (0.03) b^ ¼ -0.0011 (0.0006) e^t  b^pt between -0.1 and -0.4
s^t between -0.8 and -3.1
R2 = 0.97
(ii) System GMM estimation, number of observations used (including levels): 449
a^ = 0.91*** (0.02) b^ ¼ 0.0011*** (0.0003) e^t  b^pt between -0.1 and -0.4
s^t between -1.2 and -4.8
R2 = 0.98
The estimations are performed with the plm-package in R [25], total number of insurance policies used is
37 (because a merged policy is treated as a new ID). Estimation (ii) includes individual effects. Sargan test:
36.1 (D.f. = 106, P value = 1), Wald test for coefficients (D.f. = 2) has a P value\ 0.2 e-16. R2 statistics
is not a part of standard GMM output. It is added for the sake of comparison with the first regression in this
table, defined as corr s s^ð Þ2. Additional estimations results are available by the authors upon request
* P value\0.1; ** P value\0.05; *** P value\0.01
Table 5 Estimation results for
the health plan price elasticity in
the reform year 2006
log (sit) = a log (si,t-1) ? bpit ? eit, pt ¼ 1025 euros
OLS estimation, reform year t = 2006, number of observations: 54
a^ = 0.84*** (0.05) b^ ¼  0.0055*** (0.0021), e^t  b^pt ¼ 5:7 (2.1)
s^t = -35.6
R2 = 0.84
We have fewer observations in our estimations than insurance policies in the data because new insurers
entering the market in 2005 have a market share of zero and drop out of the sample
* P value\0.1; ** P value\0.05; *** P value\0.01
21 Not shown here, but available from the authors upon request.
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A conceptual problem with the interpretation of elas-
ticities is that a high degree of persistence may indicate the
presence of perfect competition or high consumer inertia.
In the case of perfect competition there would be no con-
sumer mobility since consumers would have chosen the
optimal insurance product and insurers would fully adjust
their prices to changes in marginal costs over the years. As
shown in many studies, however, status quo bias and
consumer inertia play a large role in health insurance
markets [21, 29]. Our findings show that the Dutch health
insurance market is no exception. From 2006 to 2014, 69%
of the Dutch population never switched to another health
insurer despite a growing premium variation [30].22
Limitations
Although we estimated the health plan price elasticities
using the same methodology and a similar dataset, a good
comparison of health plan price elasticities between the
SHI and HIA periods is still complicated.
A limitation of our study is that by using fixed effects we
can control for constant differences of unobserved market
and institutional characteristics, but we cannot control for
possible changes in these characteristics. A first market
characteristic that may change over time and for which we
lack sufficient data is supplementary insurance.23 Since
about 85% of the population buys supplementary insurance
and almost all from the same insurer from which they
obtain basic health insurance, changes in supplementary
insurance may have affected basic health plan choice. In
contrast to supplementary insurance, basic health insurance
offers are very transparent and easy to compare, because
benefit packages are the same across all insurers, premiums
are community-rated and cost-sharing arrangements are
standardized (deductible levels are the same across all
basic health plans). Therefore, most health insurers pri-
marily use the basic health plan premiums in their mar-
keting activities during the open enrollment period at the
end of each year. Comparing prices and benefit packages of
supplementary insurance is much more complicated for
consumers because products and prices are difficult to
compare and because of the vast number of supplementary
insurance packages that are offered.24 Since having sup-
plementary insurance is found to be negatively related to
people’s propensity to switch basic health plans [16], the
increasing differentiation of supplementary insurance
products may have resulted in downward-biased price
elasticities of basic health plan choice in later years.
A second market characteristic that has changed since
2006 is the proportion of people opting for a voluntary
deductible for basic health insurance.25 People of 18 years
and older can choose a voluntary deductible of 100, 200,
300, 400 or 500 euros on top of the mandatory deductible
in return for a premium discount.26 The number of people
choosing a voluntary deductible has increased from about
6% in 2006 to about 12% in 2015 [13]. If there is no strong
correlation across insurers between health plan premiums
Table 6 Estimation results for
the health plan price elasticity in
the HIA market 2006–2015
log (sit) = a log (si,t-1) ? bpit ? ci ? dt ? eit, pt ranging from 1100 to 1300 euros (Table 2)
(iv) OLS estimation, Number of observations: 577
a^ = 0.95*** (0.01) b^ ¼ 0.0017** (0.0008), et ¼ b^pt between -1.9 and -2.2
s^t between -34 and -40
R2 = 0.97
(v) GMM estimation, number of observations (including levels): 1013
a^ = 0.81*** (0.03) b^ ¼  0.0008*** (0.0001), et ¼ b^pt between -0.9 and -1.0
s^t between -4.7 and -5.5
R2 = 0.99
The estimations are performed with the plm-package in R [25], total number of policies used is 155, making
distinction between collective and individual policies and using only policies with a minimum of 10,000
enrollees. We use a system GMM estimator with endogenous premiums, including time dummies and fixed
effects. Sargan statistics (85.83, D.f. = 68, P value = 0.071), Wald test for coefficients of this model
(D.f. = 2) has a P value\0.2 e-16. Additional estimations results are available by the authors upon
request
* P value\0.1; ** P value\0.05; *** P value\0.01
22 Individual level data from almost all health insurers show that 20%
of the population switched once, 7% twice, 2% three times and 1%
switched four times between 2006 and 2015 [30].
23 There is some fragmented information available on supplementary
benefits packages and premiums for a few recent years but consistent
time series are lacking. Schut and Hassink [2] tackled the problem of
differentiated supplementary insurance products by using the price of
a ‘most common’ supplementary benefits package and by re-
estimating their equations with the total price (i.e. the sum of basic
and supplementary insurance premiums). However, their study
covered only the period 1996–1998 in the SHI market when product
differentiation was limited.
24 In 2015 people could choose among 276 supplementary health
plans, of which 94 were specific dental health plans, resulting in more
than 1300 possible choice combinations [10].
25 Taking into account voluntary deductibles complicates the
estimation procedure because only a few consumers opt for such a
deductible.
26 The mandatory deductible was 150 euros in 2007 and it was
gradually raised in subsequent years to 375 euros in 2015.
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with or without a voluntary deductible, our price elastici-
ties are likely to be biased. However, we find that premi-
ums of both types of health plans are highly correlated, and
therefore this bias may not be substantial.27
A third changing characteristic of the HIA market is the
increasing role of limited-provider plans, making health
plans more heterogeneous over time. As shown in Table 1
the share of the population enrolled in limited provider
plans gradually increased from 0.1% in 2008 to 7.5% in
2015. Limited provider plans are typically lower priced
than health plans with unrestricted provider choice. If
limited provider plans are offering lower (perceived)
quality than unrestricted health plans, our price elasticities
may be biased downwards because it is likely that more
people would have chosen lower-priced plans if quality
would have been the same.
A comparison of price elasticities between SHI andHIA is
also complicated by the changes in institutional character-
istics of the choice setting. An important difference between
the SHI and HIA is the way in which premium subsidies are
structured. As a result premium levels in the HIAmarket are
on average 3 to 6 times higher than in the SHI market.
Adjusting for the different premium levels would reduce the
difference between the estimated price elasticities between
both markets, but it is not clear to what extent because the
impact of the premium level on price elasticity is difficult to
assess. For instance, different premium levels may induce a
different behavioural response, since consumers may not
only respond to absolute but also to relative premium dif-
ferences [31]. All other things equal, this would result in
higher price elasticities in the SHI market than in the HIA
market.28 Price elasticities may also be somewhat higher in
SHI than HIA because the SHI did not cover high-income
people, whomay be less sensitive to price than lower-income
people (because of a diminishing marginal utility of money).
Another difference that may complicate a good com-
parison is the much higher number of choice options in the
HIA market than in the SHI market. This may have had a
downward effect on the price elasticity in the HIA market
because of information and choice overload [32].
Since it is not possible to disentangle all these possible
effects, we cannot determine to what extent the increase in
estimated health plan price elasticities was driven by the
reform. For this reason the quantitative changes in health
plan price elasticities we estimated should be interpreted
only as a rough indication of the impact of 20 years of
managed competition reforms in the Netherlands.
Conclusion
In 1996 managed competition was introduced in the Dutch
social health insurance (SHI) scheme. From 1996 to 2005
health insurers had few tools and limited incentives to
compete, and consumers had little incentive to switch. In
2006 a major reform was implemented to provide insurers
with more incentives and tools to compete and to provide
consumers with a more differentiated health plan choice.
Using data on prices and market shares of all health plans
over a 20-year period (1995–2015) we provide a long-term
overview with respect to the number of switchers,
switching gains and health plan price elasticities in the
Dutch insurance market. The Dutch setting is especially
interesting because it describes the first and subsequent
steps of introducing managed competition into a social
health insurance market. This information is not only
useful for Dutch policymakers but also for other countries
following a similar path.
Prior to the reform (1995–2005) we find modest increas-
ing total switching gains increasing from about 0 in 1995 to 7
million euros per year in 2005. The reasons are small pre-
miumvariations and a low number of switchers, between 2 to
4% a year. If all consumers had switched to one of the lowest
priced health plans, switching gains could have been
100–200 times larger in any year (of course this holds only
for a single year and not for the entire period). We find
modest short-term health plan price elasticities ranging from
-0.1 to -0.4, depending on the annual premium level.
The introduction of the reforms (2006) resulted in an all-
time high switching rate of 18% and a health plan price
elasticity of-5.7. Moreover, switching gains for consumers
peaked with total gains of 130 million in the first year of the
reform (2006). Themain reason is that the reform had a large
impact on consumer awareness of switching possibilities.
In the post-reform decade (2007–2015), the number of
switchers returned to lower levels with the proportion of
switchers increasing from about 4 to 8%. Consumers
financially benefited much more from switching health
plans than in the SHI (on average about 45 euros per
switcher per year since 2006), although total switching
gains in any year still could have been about 10 times
higher if all people had switched to one of the lowest priced
health plans. We find health plan price elasticities that
range from -0.9 to -2.2.
A good comparison of short- and long-term health plan
price elasticities between the SHI and HIA period is com-
plicated because in our estimations we may not perfectly
control for unobserved changing market and institutional
27 The Pearson correlation between the full premium and the
discounted premium ranges from 0.81 to 0.98 in 2008-2015, whereas
the Spearman rank correlation ranges from 0.63 to 0.88 over the same
period. In 2007, both correlations were somewhat lower (about 0.5)
but in that year the share of the enrollees choosing a voluntary
deductible was extremely low.
28 This is an interesting topic for future research.
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characteristics. We do find strong evidence of substantial
consumer inertia as the degree of choice persistence varied
from about 0.8 to 0.9 during the 20-year period. Strong
persistence also implies that long-term price elasticities
could be much higher than short-term price elasticities,
because people only slowly respond to changing prices.
The high forgone potential switching gains and high level
of persistence suggest that many people make suboptimal
choices, particularly because quality differences between
health plans appear to be small [10]. Therefore, an active
policy to improve health plan choice may be welfare
enhancing in this case. One option is to increase transparency
in the insurance market by facilitating better informed con-
sumer choices.29 Although comparative health plan infor-
mation is readily available on the internet, this information is
often incomplete (e.g. lacking information on available
group contracts) and sometimes biased by commercial
interests (e.g. brokers’ fees are paid when the consumer
enrolls into a health plan via a comparison website). It is
important to ensure that choice sites offer independent,
complete and comprehensive information on health plans
(and if possible also on group contracts). Also, consumer
education campaigns on how to choose a suitable health plan
and how to recognize a good quality choice site is a way of
improving consumer choice. Another option for lowering
consumer search costs is to improve the choice structure for
the type of health plans offered by insurers (perhaps
‘bronze’, ‘silver’, ‘gold’ and ‘platinum’ health plans, which
would be easy to distinguish for consumers). In the Nether-
lands, some steps have been taken in this direction by
requiring insurers to publish prices of ‘‘similar’’ health plans
that are sold under different labels or through different
channels. It is expected that this will make it easier for
consumers to select the cheapest plan. Similar rules could
also be imposed with respect to information on premium
discounts on group contracts, many of which are open to all
consumers. Lastly, insurers could be obliged to inform
consumers actively, regarding changes in the contracted
provider network relevant to the consumers’ residential area.
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Appendix A
In this appendix we explain how we calculated switching
gains. In the SHI market, 1996-2005, this is straightforward
and switching gains SGt in year t are defined as:
SGt ¼ Nt
X
j
Pj;tðsj;t1  sj;tÞ
Pj,t is the premium of insurance policy of insurer j in year t,
sj,t is the market share of insurer j in year t and Nt is the
total number of premium payers in year t.
In the HIA market it is more complicated because we have
individual and group contracts. Most of these policies were
offered both as individual contracts and as group contracts. Our
dataset is complete for all years, except for 2006 and 2007.30
When an insurance firm withdraws some policy from the
market, it usually reallocates the enrollees to the closest alter-
native policy in its portfolio, and this alternative policy
becomes inour calculations thedefault optionof these enrollees
for the next year.31 In the computation of switching gains we
make the following two assumptions. First, if an insurer offers a
policy in year (t-1) but does not offer the same policy in year t
then we assume that in year t these enrollees would be offered
the closest available policy of the same insurer as a ‘default
option’. We use this assumption for individual and group
contracts. Next, we allocate the individual and group market
shares of policies that exited the market in year (t-1) to the
respective default options. Secondly, if a new policy enters the
market inyear t (which is not adefault optionof apolicy leaving
the market) then we assume the market share of this policy in
year (t-1) was zero. The total switching gains represent the
weighted average price change that arises because of reallo-
cation of enrollees among contracts, multiplied by the number
of premium payers Nt:
SGt ¼ Nt
X
j
Pij;tðsij;t1  sij;tÞ þ Pcj;tðscj;t1  scj;tÞ;
where Pj,t
i is the premium of all individual insurance poli-
cies of insurer j in year t, Pj,t
c is the premium of all group (or
collective) insurance policies of insurer j in year t, sj,t
i is the
market share of all individual insurance policies of insurer
j in year t and sj,t
c is the market share of all group insurance
policies of insurer j in year t.
29 As shown by Handel [29], the welfare effects of improving health
plan choice are theoretically ambiguous because the positive welfare
effects may be offset by increasing adverse selection. In the Dutch
case, however, adverse selection is effectively constrained by
sophisticated risk adjustment. Therefore, it is likely that in the Dutch
setting improving individual-level plan choices will enhance welfare.
30 A few missing values were imputed using the information from
neighbouring years.
31 It would be incorrect to see the enrollees who remain on this policy
as ‘switchers’.
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These gains can be attributed to three sources:
1. Switching gains within the individual insurance seg-
ment: SGt
i
2. Switching gains within the group insurance segment:
SGct
3. Switching gains from individual to group (or vice
versa): SGt
ic
We can calculate these three types of switching gains.
First we define
DPit ¼
X
j
Pij;tðsij;t1=sit1  sij;t=sitÞ
DPct ¼
X
j
Pcj;tðscj;t1=sct1  scj;t=sct Þ
DPict ¼
X
j
Pij;ts
i
j;t=s
i
t  Pcj;tscj;t=sct
where sit and s
c
t are market shares of the respective segment
at time t. Note that the market shares sum up to one at any
time t:
P
jsj,t
i ? sj,t
c = st
i ? st
c = 1, and Pij;t and Pj,t
c denote
individual and collective premiums of policy j at time
t. Using these notations, the total switching gains are
decomposed into the three sources as follows:
SGt ¼ SGit þ SGct þ SGict
¼ DPitsit1Nt1 þ DPct sct1Nt1 þ DPict ðsct  sct1ÞNt1
Appendix B
See Tables 7, 8 and 9.
Table 7 Health insurers that were active in the SHI market during 1995–2005
Health insurer Operating years Number of annual obs. Additional informationa
1 AGIS 2001–2005 5 New large insurer, merger of Anova, ZAO, ANOZ
2 Amicon 1995–2005 11 Large insurer
3 Anderzorg 1995–2005 11 Small insurer
4 Anova 1995–2001 7 Large regional insurer, merged in 2002 into AGIS
5 ANOZ 1996–2001 6 Large regional insurer, merged in 2002 into AGIS
6 Azivo 1995–2005 11 Medium sized regional insurer.
7 CZ Groep 1995–2005 11 Large insurer
8 De Friesland 1995–2005 11 Medium sized regional insurer
9 DSW 1995–2005 11 Medium sized regional insurer
10 Geove 1995–2005 11 Medium sized insurer
11 Groene Land 1995–2005 11 Large insurer
12 Nederzorg 1998–2005 8 New small insurer
13 Nuts 1995–2005 11 Medium sized insurer
14 NZC 1997–1999 3 New small insurer, left market in 2000
15 OHRA 1995–1999 5 Small insurer, merged with Nuts in 2000
16 ONVZ 1997–2005 9 New small insurer
17 OZ 1996–2005 11 Large insurer
18 OZB 1998–2005 8 New small insurer
19 Pro Life 1996–2000 4 New small insurer, merged in 2001 with ANOVA
20 PWZ 1995–2001 7 Medium sized insurer, merged in 2002 with Groene Land
21 Salland 1995–2005 11 Small insurer
22 SR Rotterdam 1995–2005 11 Small regional insurer
23 Topzorg 1995–1999 4 Small regional insurer, merged with Geove in 2000
24 Trias 1995–2005 11 Medium sized regional insurer
25 Unive´ 1995–2005 11 Large insurer
26 VGZ 1995–2005 11 Large insurer
27 ZAO 1995–2001 7 Large regional insurer, merged in 2002 into AGIS
28 ZK 1995–2005 11 Large insurer
29 ZK Noordwijk 1995–1997 3 Medium sized regional insurer, merged in 1998 with ZK
30 ZK Spaarneland 1995–1997 3 Medium sized regional insurer, merged in 1998 with ZK
31 ZON 1995–1999 5 Medium sized insurer, merged in 2000 with Amicon
32 Zorg and Zekerheid 1995–2005 11 Medium sized regional insurer
a Our observation series are unbroken and cover 100% of the market. In total we obtained 270 observations. Note that in our estimations we need
at least three consecutive years of data to perform GMM estimations. An insurer is denoted ‘‘small’’ if in the last year of the sample the market
share was less than 1%, ‘‘medium sized’’ if the market share was between 1 and 5%, and ‘‘large’’ if the market share was larger than 5%. We also
indicate whether an insurer operated mainly regionally
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Table 8 Health insurers that were active during the reform years 2005–2006
Health insurer Operating years Number of annual obs.a Additional informationb
1 AGIS 2005–2006 2 Large insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI and PHI market
2 Anderzorg 2005–2006 2 Small Insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI and PHI market
3 Ave´ro 2005–2006 2 Medium sized insurer, operated in 2005 in PHI market
4 Azivo 2005–2006 2 Small insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI market
5 AZVZ 2005–2006 2 Small insurer, operated in 2005 in PHI market
6 Confior 2005–2006 2 Small insurer, operated in 2005 in PHI market
7 CZ–Group 2005–2006 2 Large insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI and PHI market
8 De Friesland 2005–2006 2 Medium sized insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI and PHI market
9 De Goudse 2005–2006 2 Small insurer, operated in 2005 in PHI market
10 Delta Loyd 2005–2006 2 Medium sized insurer, operated in 2005 in PHI market
11 DSW 2005–2006 2 Medium sized insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI market
12 FBTO 2005–2006 2 Medium sized insurer, operated in 2005 in PHI market
13 FORTIS 2005–2006 2 Medium sized insurer, operated in 2005 in PHI market
14 Groene Land 2005–2006 2 Large insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI market
15 Interpolis 2005–2006 2 Small insurer, operated in 2005 in PHI market
16 IZA 2005–2006 2 Medium sized insurer, operated in 2005 in PHI market
17 IZZ 2005–2006 2 Medium sized insurer, operated in 2005 in PHI market
18 Menzis 2005–2006 2 Large insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI and PHI market
19 OHRA 2005–2006 2 Medium sized insurer, operated in 2005 in PHI market
20 ONVZ 2005–2006 2 Medium sized insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI market
21 OZ 2005–2006 2 Medium sized insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI market
22 OZB 2005–2006 2 Small insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI and PHI market
23 PNO 2005–2006 2 Small insurer, operated in 2005 in PHI market
24 Salland 2005–2006 2 Small insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI market
25 SR 2005–2006 2 Small insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI market
26 Trias 2005–2006 2 Medium sized insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI and PHI market
27 UMC 2005–2006 2 Small insurer, operated in 2005 in PHI market
28 Unive´ 2005–2006 2 Medium sized insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI and PHI market
29 VGZ 2005–2006 2 Large insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI and PHI market
30 Zorg and Zekerheid 2005–2006 2 Medium sized insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI and PHI market
31 ZK 2005–2006 2 Large insurer, operated in 2005 in SHI and PHI market
a Prior to 2006 some health insurers were only active in the social health insurance (SHI) market, some only in the private health insurance
market (PHI) and some in both markets. Since 2006 all insurers have been active in the same market, but market shares of all insurers had to be
collected from both markets in 2005. For each health insurer we obtained market shares of all individual contracts and (the sum) of all group
contracts in 2005. For 2006 we obtained individual and group market shares and corresponding nominal premiums, where the premium for the
group contracts for each insurer is calculated by taking the average (with market share) weighted premiums of all individual group contracts
b We denoted whether an insurer was active in 2005 as a former sickness fund in the SHI market and/or as a private indemnity insurer on the PHI
market. An insurer is denoted ‘‘small’’ if, in the year 2006, its market share was less than 1%, ‘‘medium sized’’ if the market share was between 1
and 5%, and ‘‘large’’ if the market share was larger than 5%
Table 9 Health insurers that operated in the HIA market during 2007–2015
Health
insurer
Holding
2016c
Operating
years
No. of Annual
obs.
No. of
policiesa
Additional informationb
1 AGIS Achmea 2007–2014 8 2–5 Large insurer, since 2008 part of holding Achmea
2 Anderzorg Menzis 2007–2015 8 1 Medium sized insurer
3 ASR ASR 2007–2015 8 2–4 Medium sized insurer
4 Ave´ro Achmea 2007–2011 8 2–4 Large insurer
5 Azivo Menzis 2007–2015 8 1 Medium sized insurer, since 2008 part of holding
Menzis
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Operating
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